Impact of personal economic environment and personality factors on individual financial decision making by Susanne Prinz et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 04 March 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00158
Impact of personal economic environment and personality
factors on individual ﬁnancial decision making
Susanne Prinz 1, Gerhard Gründer 2 , Ralf D. Hilgers 3 , Oliver Holtemöller 4,5 and IngoVernaleken2*
1 Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Centre for Integrative Psychiatry, University Hospital of Psychiatry Zurich, Rheinau, Switzerland
2 Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Faculty of Medicine, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
3 Institute of Medical Statistics, Faculty of Medicine, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
4 Department of Macroeconomics, Halle Institute for Economic Research, Halle, Germany
5 Martin Luther University, Halle, Germany
Edited by:
Aldo Rustichini, University of
Minnesota, USA
Reviewed by:
Bernd Weber,
Rheinische-Friedrich-Wilhelms
Universität, Germany
Milica Milosavljevic, Stanford
University, USA
*Correspondence:
Ingo Vernaleken, Department of
Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and
Psychosomatics, Faculty of Medicine,
RWTH Aachen University,
Pauwelsstrasse 30, 52074 Aachen,
Germany
e-mail: ivernaleken@ukaachen.de
This study on healthy young male students aimed to enlighten the associations between
an individual’s ﬁnancial decision making and surrogate makers for environmental factors
covering long-term ﬁnancial socialization, the current ﬁnancial security/responsibility, and
the personal afﬁnity to ﬁnancial affairs as represented by parental income, funding situation,
and ﬁeld of study. A group of 150 male young healthy students underwent two versions of
the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery paradigm (matrix and random sequential version). Their
ﬁnancial decision was mainly driven by the factor “source of funding”: students with strict
performance control (grants, scholarships) had much higher rates of relative risk aversion
(RRA) than subjects with support from family (RRA = 0.22; p = 0.018). Personality scores
only modestly affected the outcome. In an ANOVA, however, also the intelligence quotient
signiﬁcantly and relevantly contributed to the explanation of variance; the effects of parental
income and the personality factors “agreeableness” and “openness” showed moderate
to modest – but signiﬁcant – effects. These ﬁndings suggest that environmental factors
more than personality factors affect risk aversion.
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INTRODUCTION
In economics and politics, it is generally assumed that individual
ﬁnancial decision making is a cognitive process based on ratio-
nal weighing of the corresponding gains, losses, and risks. This
very mechanistic approach culminated very early in Pascal’sWager
(1670). Pascal (1670) proposed that it might be logical to believe
in God when considering the risks of the false negative expectation
(hell) and the gain in the correct positive case (paradise) against the
minimal effects of a correct denial of God. More generally, Pascal
(1670) argued that a decision maker should assess the desirability
of each option by representing it as having a value and a likelihood.
This early conceptwas to some extent adapted to the circumstances
of human behavior by Bernoulli (1738) who said that the gain/risk
relationship is not linearly related due to a general risk avoidant
factor. Thus, a logarithmic transformation of value has come to
be known as a “utility,” and the sum of probability-weighted util-
ities has come to be known as “expected utility” (Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). This and consecutive models, however, are
highly mechanistic and reductionistic. Individual differences in
the weighing of risks and gains, the subject’s level of risk aversion
or reward seeking, and the complex neurobiological process of
decision making are not integrated in these models.
Over the past years, neurobiologists have shown increas-
ing interest in neuroeconomic issues such as the impact of
risk seeking or risk aversion. Neuroeconomics as a new ﬁeld
of interdisciplinary research is currently on the rise, analyz-
ing the relationship between economic theories and neurosci-
entiﬁc considerations (Camerer et al., 2004, 2005; McFadden,
2005; Camerer, 2007). Although the importance of individual
behavioral factors and neuropsychological issues in economic
decision making is now increasingly recognized, neuroeconomic
issues still do not receive adequate attention and individual
factors that inﬂuence risky decision making are not always
taken into consideration in socioeconomics. In fact, cerebral
activation studies revealed ﬁndings, which suggest a complex
processing of gain and loss expectations which could roughly
be separated into two pathways: ﬂuorodeoxyglucose positron
emission tomography (FDG-PET) and functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) studies uncovered relevant structures
and cerebral networks which are active prior to risky choices
(in particular nucleus accumbens, NAc) or prior to loss pre-
diction (e.g., anterior insula), suggesting that a suitable balance
of gain/loss prediction is important for adequate decision mak-
ing (Knutson et al., 2008; Balodis et al., 2012). Paradigms that
show the associations between gain/loss prediction and spatially
selective brain activations primarily mimic short-term ﬁnancial
decisions.
Individuals may show different long-term patterns of decision
making including general traits such as risk aversion, reward seek-
ing, or the individual levels of liberality and velocity in decision
making. Human behavior may be regarded as the sum of a per-
son’s decisions and contributes essentially to the formation of
an individual’s personality. Thus, it is not surprising that some
previous studies using personality inventories reported some pos-
itive correlations between “novelty seeking” items and risk-loving
behavior dimensions (Kelley et al., 2004). “Impulsivity” was also
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found to be a contributing factor (Burnett Heyes et al., 2012).
These investigations have not been restricted to ﬁnancial decision
making, but include general risk seeking behavior. It appears to
be likely that personality traits have a relevant impact on ﬁnancial
decisions. It is, furthermore, noteworthy that much of the pre-
vious literature was performed by using gambling tasks, which,
however, do not fully depict the processes of most of the ﬁnancial
decisions. The Holt and Laury paradigm was claimed to be more a
ﬁnancial decision task under situations of uncertainty rather than
a gambling task (Deck et al., 2008); thus, it better satisﬁes the needs
of the present experiment.
Nevertheless, a model including gains, losses, risks, and indi-
vidual patterns of decision making (independent of the etiopatho-
logical hypotheses) still appears to be too reductionist. In general,
human decisions also depend on environmental conditions, on
individual experiences and preoccupations; also age and gender
were previously shown to be important inﬂuencing factors (e.g.,
Harris et al., 2006). In particular the present personal economic
environment (security, independence, wealth) as well as the his-
tory of economic experiences may have a reasonable inﬂuence
on ﬁnancial decision making. Furthermore, individual economic
insight and preoccupations may bias ﬁnancial decisions that way
that they are not simply an analog of the subject’s overall risk
seeking and avoidance.
The present experimental and hypothesis-driven investiga-
tion was designed to prospectively test the relative inﬂu-
ence of economic environmental and personality factors on
ﬁnancial decision making. It was focused on long-term
ﬁnancial socialization/experiences, the current ﬁnancial secu-
rity/independence/responsibility, and the personal afﬁnity to
ﬁnancial affairs; these environmental factors were characterized
by few, clearly deﬁned, objective, and relevant surrogate parame-
ters. (parental income, funding situation, and ﬁeld of study). On
the other hand, already known important and inﬂuencing param-
eters such as age, gender, and cognitive performance have been
highly restricted. Also the status of career and the educational level
was highly restricted (students) in order to reduce the complexity
of inﬂuencing factors. The subject’s individual risk aversion was
quantiﬁed using a well-established lottery paradigm in its original
version with all risk options uncovered (matrix version) and in a
rearranged less transparent version (Holt and Laury, 2002). We
hypothesize that environmental factors effectively inﬂuence the
decision making process and exhibit interactions with personality
factors.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee. For
recruitment, ﬂyers and advertisements were displayed in lecture
halls and university buildings. In order to avoid unintended vari-
ance and confounding factors, narrow inclusion criteria were
employed: all subjects had to be male, mentally healthy (includ-
ing absence of substance abuse and dependency), free of relevant
somatic complaints and aged between 18 and 25 years. 150 sub-
jects (age: 23.7 ± 3.4 years [mean ± SD]) were included for
participation after a telephone or email based pre-screening pro-
cedure. They were matriculated predominantly for studies in
medicine (n = 41), economics (n = 66), or teacher training
(n = 20). Further exclusion criteria comprised mental diseases
in ﬁrst-degree relatives, psychotropic drug intake in the last
6months, and any chronic treatmentwith potentially psychoactive
drugs.
STUDY DESIGN
The subjects were scheduled for participation in groups of 16–44
persons. All subjects sat in front of a computer terminal and
found additional working materials on their desk. As surrogate
parameters for the inﬂuence of environmental long-term ﬁnan-
cial socialization, the current ﬁnancial security/responsibility, and
the personal afﬁnity to ﬁnancial affairs the respective parame-
ters were surveyed: parental income, funding situation, and ﬁeld
of study. Thus, the subjects were asked to provide informa-
tion about their age, their ﬁeld of study, the estimated income
of their parents [(1): up to 1,500 €/month; (2): 1,500–3,500
€//month; (3): 3,500–7,000 €/month; (4): more than 7,000
€/month], and the major source for the means of subsistence
[(1): loan; (2): grant/scholarship; (3): parents/family; (4): own
income; (5): other]. Subjects were free to refuse personal infor-
mation about their parents’ income (n = 19) and their funding
situation (n = 2). For further analyses, the source of funding
groups 3 and 4 were merged in the “Family/Work” group due to
the fact, that these students usually do not experience a high inten-
sity of performance control; conversely, groups 1, 2 (with high
performance control) and 5 were merged. Personality dimensions
were acquired by use of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO
FFI; Costa and McCrae, 1992); the subject’s intelligence was esti-
mated using the culture fair intelligence test (CFT; Weiß, 2006).
Finally, the subject performed the original and a modiﬁed ver-
sion of the Holt and Laury lottery paradigm (Holt and Laury,
2002). All gains which were individually achieved (see below)
were paid off directly, ramped up by a small ﬁxed amount of
10€ which served as a blanket reimbursement for time and travel
expenses. All personalized information including the amount
of the individual payoff was pseudonymized using a unique ID
number.
CULTURE FAIR INTELLIGENCE TEST (CFT 20-R) – SHORT FORM
This task estimates the individual ability to uncover logical rela-
tions, series and classiﬁcations by minimizing the bias of language
and cultural background (Weiß, 2006). There are only short
instructions (10 min). It consists of four subtests using struc-
tured images indicating (1) series [15 items], (2) classiﬁcations
[15 items], (3) matrices [15 items], and (4) topologies [11 items].
For the short version of the CFT 20-R, the subject has a maximum
of 27 min for solving the whole task (7 + 7 + 6 + 7 min). For
the respective age group (20–25 years.), the CFT-reference sample
showed an average number of correctly solved items of 39.5 out
of 56.
NEO FIVE-FACTOR INVENTORY
This multidimensional NEO FFI consists of 60 items partitioned
into ﬁve dimensions (N=neuroticism, E= extraversion, O= open-
ness to experience, A = agreeableness, and C = conscientiousness),
known as the Big Five, consisting of 12 items each (Costa and
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McCrae, 1992), ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly dis-
agree” (coded in ﬁve values). In this study, we used the German
version of the NEO FFI (Borkenau and Ostendorf, 2008).
LOTTERY PARADIGM
Basically, we determined the level at which an individual is willing
to surrender a comparatively safe combination of stakes in favor
of a more risky combination of stakes in a lottery paradigm. To
this end, we used the same experimental setup as Holt and Laury
(2002) did in their well-established real-payment driven lottery
experiment. The lottery was played on computers. In short, the
Holt and Laury paradigm presents to the subjects a matrix of ten
subsequent lottery draws. For each of the draws, the subject can
choose between a low-risk and a high-risk option. For the low-risk
options, there is only a slight difference between the respective
high payoff (2.00€) and the respective low payoff (1.60€). In the
high-risk option the respective payoffs are 3.85€ vs. 0.10€. The ten
subsequent draws differ from each other by increasing probabili-
ties of the high payoff, starting with p = 0.1 and ending at p = 1.0
(nine increments of 0.1). All of the ten lotteries are clearly compre-
hensible and simultaneously presented in one display. After a time
of reﬂection the subject is asked to choose between the high-risk
and low-risk options for all draws. Usually, the subjects begin with
the low-risk option at p = 0.1 and switch to the high-risk option
later. In the present study, the whole procedure was repeated with
payoffs that were multiplied by a scaling factor [high-stake condi-
tion (HSS)]. This scaling factor (s) was ﬁxed to a standard value of
s = 20. Finally, a third lottery was conducted again using a scaling
factor of 1; the latter was, however, not included in the calcula-
tion of the relative risk aversion (r, RRA) and the wealth factor
(W ). Before the lottery paradigm was performed in the original
(matrix) version (for an example screenshot see Figure 1), a mod-
iﬁed version was played. In order to elicit more spontaneous and
less deliberated choices, the lottery was played in a sequential ver-
sion. The general conditions of the probabilities, stakes, and gains
remained unchanged. The player, however, was presented only one
lottery iteration per screen. These single draws were presented in
random order with respect to the winning probability (p). Each
probability level was presented three times so that in each stake
condition (high-stake vs. low-stake) the subject had to make 30
decisions. In the matrix version, the earnings of the low-stake con-
dition (LSS)were displayed immediately after the gamebut needed
to bewaived before entering theHSS. The earnings of theHSSwere
again displayed before entering the second LSS (only in the matrix
version). The earnings of the second low-stake lottery (matrix
version) were added to the high-stake lottery payoff. The primary
outcome parameters reﬂect the level of probability at which the
subject switches from the relatively safe to the risky options. In
order to determine this level unequivocally, within onematrix only
one switch (to the riskier option) was allowed. Otherwise the sub-
ject’s choices were considered inconsistent and the corresponding
observations were dropped from the statistical analyses. Conse-
quently, in the original matrix version, there are three switching
points: one for the ﬁrst low-stake, one for the second low-stake
and one for the HSS (LSM1, LSM2, and HSM). These primary
outcome parameters can be inserted in the calculation of the indi-
vidual’s RRA and his wealth factor – for details see Holt and Laury
(2002) and Heinemann (2008). In short, the basic associations
between the expected utility of the high-stake and the expected
utility of the LSS (when unaffected by the stake condition) were
deﬁned as p(2s)1−r + (1-p) × (1.6s)1−r = p(3.85s)1−r + (1-
p) × (0.1s)1−r where p is the probability at which the subject
switches, s is the scaling factor (20), and r is the RRA. The
values “2,” “1.6,” “3.85,” and “0.1” reﬂect the before-mentioned
payoffs in Euro. Increasing dissociations of the observed p
between the low-stake and HSSs would then reﬂect increasing
RRA. Another factor, which can theoretically affect the switch-
ing level is the initial wealth (W ). Inclusion of this factor in the
above mentioned equation as offset for the expected gains yields:
p(W +2s)1−r + (1−p)× (W +1.6s)1−r =p(W +3.85s)1−r + (1−
p) × (W + 0.1s)1−r. Estimates of RRA and W were calculated
after insertion of the observed switching probabilities in the ﬁrst
low-stake and the HSS (p∗L and p∗H ).
Since in the sequential paradigm inconsistencies regarding
switching back were not only allowed but intended, these sub-
jects were not excluded; the switching point was calculated by
means of a curve-ﬁtting procedure. To this end, for each deci-
sion the respective winning probability (x) was plotted against a
value of “1” (high-risk choice) or “−1” (low-risk choice) (y). That
point where the ﬁtted curve crossed the x-axis was deﬁned as the
switching point (LSS for the LSS and HSS for the HSS).
STATISTICS
Since we were interested in a monotone relationship between the
outcome parameters HSS, LSS, W, RRA we calculated Spearman
rank correlation coefﬁcients with corresponding 95% conﬁdence
intervals. Group comparisons were carried out by t-tests. Test
results were considered signiﬁcant, if the p-value is below the
signiﬁcance level of 5%. We furthermore ﬁtted an analysis of
variance model (ANOVA, mixed model; SAS proc mixed, SAS
Corp., Cary, NC, USA) to the results of RRA including the
explanatory continuous variables FFI-N, FFI-E, FFI-O, FFI-A,
FFI-C, and IQ_(CFT) and categorial variables “ﬁeld of study,”
“parental income,” “family support/work” (FS/W). Initially, the
two-way interactions between the FFI variables and IQ_(CFT),
“ﬁeld of study,” “parental income,” and “family support/work” as
well as all two-way interactions between “ﬁeld of study,”“parental
income,” and “family support/work” were included in the model.
We used a backward selection procedure in order to ﬁnd the
model, which would consist of signiﬁcant factors (p < 0.05), only.
Furthermore, we applied a check for parameter instability and
restrictedmaximum likelihood effects.We crosschecked themodel
with the model in which only main effects were used as model
building factors. Due to high overlap between these models, the
main-effect-only results are reported. To describe the effects, we
used linear regression as well as linear contrast for the categorial
variables.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The students who participated in this study showed a mean
RRA ± SD of 0.51 ± 0.56 and a wealth factor (W ) of
0.75 ± 1.9 (matrix version). In the sequential paradigm, the
calculated point of equal likelihood for risky/safe decisions was
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FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of the matrix version in which all the iterations were presented simultaneously. In the sequential version (not displayed here),
only one iteration was presented at a time.
0.56 ± 0.22 in the LSS and 0.61 ± 0.25 in the HSS. For
description of the funding situation see Table 1; two students
refused to respond. With respect to parental income, 12 stu-
dents (8.0%) reported very low-income conditions whereas 15
subjects (10.0%)hadparentswith an estimatedmonthly incomeof
more than 7,000€. The culture free intelligence quotient (IQ) was
114.5 ± 14.3.
TASK COMPARISON
Three subjects had to be excluded from the matrix game due
to inconsistencies in their switching behavior (switch back). In
six cases of the high-stake sequential game no reasonable values
of the switching point could be calculated. In the conventional
matrix game, the switching level from safe to risky increased from
0.55 ± 0.16 to 0.58 ± 0.17 from the low-stake to the HSSs. This
shift toward safer decisions was on trend-level (p = 0.063; paired
t-test). In the sequential version, the difference between HSS and
LSS was signiﬁcant (HSS–LSS: 0.05; p = 0.004; paired t-test).
Nevertheless, the individuals’ decisions in the matrix version cor-
related highly with those in the sequential version of the game
(low-stake: r = +0.594; p < 0.001; 95% CI: 0.456−0.675/high-
stake: r = +0.748; p < 0.001; 95% CI: 0.666−0.813 Spearman’s
correlation; see Figure 2). As was expected, the RRA value showed
signiﬁcant correlations with the differences between the switch-
ing points of the high-stake and LSSs in the matrix (r = +0.359;
p < 0.001; 95% CI: 0.204–0.496; Spearman’s correlation) and the
sequential version (r = +0.376; p < 0.001; 95% CI: 0.224–0.511;
Spearman’s correlation). The following analyses were made using
the established RRA and W factors of the conventional matrix
paradigm.
ANALYSES OF INFLUENCING FACTORS
The students’ ﬁnancial situation had a signiﬁcant group effect
on the RRA. Students who studied under performance control
(Loan/BAFoeG) showedmuchhigher risk aversion (RRA=0.22;
95% CI: 0.04–0.41; p = 0.018; unpaired t-test; see Figure 3).
There was no effect on W. Parental income, in general, had
no inﬂuence on RRA and W. However, the subgroup with very
low parental income (less than 1,500€) showed a tendency to
lower RRA values (RRA: 0.32; 95% CI: −0.04–0.67; p = 0.084;
unpaired t-test) compared with the other students. In contrast to
our hypothesis, there was no straightforward association between
any of the personality dimensions and the RRA or W factor. Also,
whether a student studied economics had no signiﬁcant group
effect on W and RRA. Nevertheless, the ﬁeld of study had an
inﬂuence on ﬁnancial decision making when looking at the basic
parameters: students of economics generally switched earlier to
the high-risk choice. In the matrix version, this group compar-
ison revealed signiﬁcant results for the LSS (LSM1 = 0.058;
95% CI: 0.006–0.11: p = 0.030; unpaired t-test) whereas the
HSS showed only trend-level differences (HSM = 0.052; 95%
CI: −0.008–0.11: p = 0.089; unpaired t-test). In the sequen-
tial version similar group differences (LSS = 0.077; 95% CI:
0.006–0.15: p = 0.033; HSS = 0.061; 95% CI: −0.022–0.14:
p = 0.147; unpaired t-test) could be observed. This difference was
much more pronounced when comparing the students of eco-
nomics to the teacher group (sequential task: LSS = 0.136; 95%
CI: 0.016–0.26; p = 0.027; HSS = 0.172; 95% CI: 0.026–0.32;
p = 0.022; matrix task: LSM1 = 0.121; 95% CI: 0.038–0.20;
p = 0.005; HSM = 0.112; 95% CI: 0.027–0.20; p = 0.010;
unpaired t-test). The RRA was also lower in the group of eco-
nomic students; the respective differences, however, failed to reach
statistical signiﬁcance. The intelligence (IQ-CFT) did not corre-
late to any of the task-related outcome parameters in the total
sample.
ANOVA (PROC MIXED, SAS)
During model ﬁt, the inﬂuence diagnostic procedure revealed
that the records for subjects number 47, 97, 115, 119 had to be
deleted due to parameter instability, and those of subjects number
45, 125 due to high inﬂuence on the overall ﬁt (restricted maxi-
mum likelihood). We ended with the model exploration analysis,
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Table 1 | Demographics and basic outcome parameters.
All
n = 150 (100%)
Students of
economics
n = 66
(44.0%)
Students of other fields of
study
n = 61 (40.7%)
n/a
n = 23 (15.3%)
Age 23.7 (±3.4) 24.2 (±4.4) 23.1 (±2.4) 24.0 (±2.6)
Parental income
<1,500 €/m 12 (8.0%) 9 (13.6%) 1 (1.6%) 2 (8.7%)
1,500–3,500 €/m 45 (30.0%) 20 (30.3%) 18 (29.5%) 7 (30.4%)
3,500–7,000 €/m 59 (39.3%) 22 (33.3%) 26 (42.6%) 11 (47.8%)
>7,000 €/m 15 (10.0%) 5 (7.6%) 8 (13.1%) 2 (8.7%)
n/a 19 (12.7%) 10 (15.2%) 8 (13.1%) 1 (4.3%)
Funding
BAFoeG/scholarship 29 (19.3%) 16 (24.2%) 10 (16.4%) 3 (13%)
Family 87 (58.0%) 37 (56.1%) 40 (65.6%) 10 (43.5%)
Work 30 (20.0%) 11 (16.7%) 9 (14.8%) 10 (43.5%)
n/a 4 (2.6 %) 1 (1.5%) 2 (3.3%) –
IQ [CFT] 114.5 (±14.3) 111.7 (±15.4) 116.6 (±13.8) 116.6 (±11.2)
NEO FFI
Neuroticism 17.4 (±6.9) 17.8 (±7.5) 17.8 (±6.0) 15.4 (±7.4)
Extraversion 29.8 (±5.7) 29.9 (±6.0) 29.4 (±5.0) 30.7 (±6.8)
Openness to experience 28.3 (±6.0) 28.5 (±5.9) 27.0 (±5.8) 31.1 (±5.8)
Agreeableness 28.6 (±5.4) 29.5 (±5.4) 27.3 (±5.5) 29.3 (±4.9)
Conscientiousness 28.6 (±6.4) 29.9 (±6.6) 28.2 (±5.7) 33.0 (±6.6)
Lottery – matrix version
RRA 0.51 (±0.56) 0.49 (±0.66) 0.59 (±0.46) 0.45 (±0.51)
W 0.75 (±1.92) 0.94 (±2.65) 0.57 (±1.17) 0.68 (±1.03)
LSM1 0.56 (±0.16) 0.52 (±0.17) 0.60 (±0.15) 0.54 (±0.13)
HSM 0.58 (±0.18) 0.55 (±0.18) 0.60 (±0.18) 0.60 (±0.16)
LSM2 0.56 (±0.16) 0.54 (±0.16) 0.58 (±0.15) 0.54 (±0.18)
Lottery – sequential version
LSS 0.56 (±0.22) 0.52 (±0.26) 0.63 (±0.16) 0.51 (±0.17)
HSS 0.61 (±0.25) 0.57 (±0.30) 0.65 (±0.21) 0.60 (±0.15)
which showed a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of FFI-O, FFI-A, IQ_(CFT),
“parental income,” and “family support/work” on the RRA values.
Table 2 displays the results of the mixed model after inclusion of
the respective factors. According to this model, in particular the
IQ (R2 = 0.06, F = 15.35) and “family support/work” (F = 10.40)
signiﬁcantly and relevantly contributed to the explanation of vari-
ance. Also, “agreeableness” (R2 = 0.02, F = 7.71) as well as – to
a more moderate extent – “openness” (R2 = 0.01, F = 4.52) and
“parental income” (F = 4.35) signiﬁcantly added to the explana-
tion of variance of RRA. Figure 4 shows the individual plots for
RRA vs. IQ (CFT) and FFI-A.
DISCUSSION
This investigation was designed to test the inﬂuence of intrinsic
and environmental factors on the individual’s style of ﬁnan-
cial decision making. Based on the subsequently described
considerations, the protocol of this investigation focused on the
Big Five, the parental income, the funding situation, as well as the
professional orientation.
(1) The ﬁrst key ﬁnding was a signiﬁcant association between the
current funding situation and the RRA. According to our data,
subjects studying under performance control (BAFoeG, schol-
arship) displayed amore conservative attitude toward risk than
subjects who received their money from their families or from
regular employment. Figure 3 suggests that this difference is
mainly due to the lower RRA values of the students supported
by their families.
(2) A second hypothesis could be conﬁrmed: the ﬁeld of study
was signiﬁcantly related to risk aversion. Apparently, an
increased interest in economics and business affairs corre-
lates with a higher probability of making risky decisions. This
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FIGURE 2 | Graphical comparisons of the switching points (from
low to high risk choices) between the original lottery paradigm and
the sequential version. In the original version, which provides the
entire information of all lottery draws, no switch-backs were allowed.
Thus, three subjects had to be excluded from the matrix game due to
inconsistencies in their switch behavior (step back). In six other cases
of the high-stake sequential game, no reasonable values of the
switching point could be calculated.
FIGURE 3 | Depicted are the relative risk aversions (RRA) of students in
dependence on their source of funding (support by their families vs.
other forms of funding, e.g., own work or grants). Using the simple
unpaired two-tailed t -test the difference was statistically signiﬁcant
(RRA = 0.22; 95% CI: 0.04–0.41; p = 0.018).
was particularly striking in the comparison of the economic
student group with the teacher group, the latter being highly
risk-averse.
(3) A third key ﬁnding of the present study was that, con-
trary to our expectations, personality traits reﬂected by the
Big Five appeared to have only minor and statistically non-
signiﬁcant effects in direct correlational analyses. This was the
case for the initially favored item “neuroticism” as well as for
any other dimension. The mixed model, however, identiﬁed
“agreeableness” and “openness” as factors with considerable
explanatory power as main effects. Interestingly, subjects
with lower “openness” scores exhibited lower risk aversion in
their behavior with respect to their ﬁnancial situation. This
association, however, was inversed for the item“agreeableness”
(Figure 4).
(4) Finally, the results with respect to parental income were not
fully conclusive. There was no overall group effect of the latter
factor on RRA or W ; neither was there a correlation. Look-
ing speciﬁcally at the subgroup of very low parental income
(<1,500€/month), these few subjects (n = 10) displayed very
low RRA values accompanied by a high variance (mean ± SD:
0.22 ± 0.60).
Taken together, the current source of funding had the highest
inﬂuence on the assessment of risk in ﬁnancial decisions; intelli-
gence, however, was also signiﬁcantly modulating the risk strategy,
although we had expected that the variance of this important fac-
tor would be minor, since only successful students were included.
The descriptive statistics, nevertheless, showed that the SD was
nearby 15, thus suggesting a common variation, which is merely
shifted to higher CFT values. Since the matrix version of the Holt
and Laury paradigm depends on a reﬂection of expected wins, low
RRA values might be partly explained by the lack of risk recogni-
tion. Cokely and Kelley (2009) reported the relevance of cognitive
Table 2 | ANOVA results (SAS proc mixed, SAS Corp., Cary, NC, USA)
including main effects of two personality factors (NEO-FFI
openness/agreeableness), IQ (CFT), “Parental Income” (ParIncome),
and Family Support/Work (FS/W) on relative risk aversion (RRA).
Effect DF (num) DF (den) F P
FFI_O 1 127 4.52 0.0355
FFI_A 1 127 7.71 0.0063
IQ_CFT 1 127 15.35 0.0001
ParIncome 4 127 4.35 0.0025
FS/W 1 127 10.40 0.0016
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FIGURE 4 | Simple linear regressions after exclusion of six individual
datasets according to the check for parameter instability and
restricted maximum likelihood effects (proc-mixed, SAS). Depicted are
individual observations for RRA plotted versus the intelligence quotient
measured by the culture free intelligence task (CFT) and the NEO-FFI
agreeableness score (FFI-A). Furthermore, the 95% prediction limits
(dotted lines) and the 95% conﬁdence limits (blue area) are depicted.
abilities on risky choice decisions. Although in the present study
cognitive measures are restricted to the CFT, the unexpected high
variance of CFT-IQ in the present group causes a congruent effect
on RRA.
In the present study the item “parental income” as well as
the item “source of funding” were thought to reﬂect the individ-
ual’s relationship to money, assuming lower RRA in students with
substantial support by their families and ahistory of ﬁnancial secu-
rity. Including only a homogenous group of participants enabled
us to uncover the impact of targeted inﬂuencing factors such
as money-related long-term socialization/experiences (parental
income), current ﬁnancial security/independence/responsibility
(funding situation), and the personal afﬁnity to ﬁnancial affairs
(ﬁeld of study). The prospective design and the laboratory con-
ditions revealed highly reliable outcome parameters in respect to
ﬁnancial risk aversion but reduce the maximum number of par-
ticipants. This urged to reduce the number of outcome variables
and demanded a homogenous study group. As mentioned before,
there are many possible inﬂuencing environmental factors (e.g.,
age, career process, misfortune, health, family situation). The
present investigation, however, wants to focus on the impact of
present and past ﬁnancial security, independence, and responsi-
bility as well as on the individual proximity to economic topics
in comparison to standard personality factors. The restriction of
inclusion criteria to male students minimizes the effect of career
progress, aging (which causes a shift between conservative to lib-
eral decision bias), heath, and family related problems which
causes high variance and complexity but, naturally, decreases
the generalizability. The choice of outcome parameters (parental
income, funding, ﬁeld of study) is somewhat arbitrary but
appeared to be the best choice to acquire some few easy, objective,
relevant data, which highly impact the present and past ﬁnancial
situation.
For quantiﬁcation of the individual’s risk seeking tendency or
risk aversion in ﬁnancial decisions, the Holt and Laury paradigm
(Holt and Laury, 2002) was chosen because the paradigm is
well replicated and evaluated; importantly, payoffs comprised
of considerable amounts of money (in particular for students).
Furthermore, the comparison with gambling tasks (deal-or-no-
deal-game) showed that – considering the different associations
with the Domain-Speciﬁc Risk Taking attitudes – the Holt and
Laury paradigm is more speciﬁcally depicting the individual ten-
dency for risky ﬁnancial investments rather than mirroring a
general risk seeking (gambling) behavior (Deck et al., 2008). The
results of the outcome parameters (LSM1/2, HSM, RRA, and W )
were on the whole within the range of previous results and anal-
yses (Heinemann, 2008). At the end, an ANOVA showed that
personality factors (“openness” and “agreeableness”) as well as
“parental income”and“family funding”could signiﬁcantly explain
the variance in ﬁnancial decision making. Interestingly, also intel-
ligence showed an association with the RRA. In simple group
comparisons and correlational analyses, only the funding situa-
tion and the parental income showed signiﬁcant effects. “Field of
study” showed group differences in respect to the raw outcome
parameters (i.e., LSM1, HSM) but not for RRA.
Doya (2008) mentioned several general issues that inﬂuence an
individual’s decision: (1) needs/desires, (2) risk/uncertainty, (3)
time spent/left for learning, (4) gains vs. losses, (5) cost/efforts, (6)
risk/variance, (7) delay discounting, (8) exploration. For most of
these confounding variables, the present investigation was strictly
controlled. The well described area of stress to avoid losses and
to increase gains (Weller et al., 2010) was not the subject of the
present study, since for ethical reasons losses were not included in
the paradigm. Furthermore, delay discounting (Lagorio and Mad-
den, 2005) and exploration procedures were not in the focus of the
protocol. Most importantly, the levels of risk and uncertainty were
clearly deﬁned and easy to recognize for the subject. The results,
therefore, must be viewed within the scope of expected gains,
well-deﬁned risks, the individual’s needs and desires. Against
the background of the present results, the tendency to prefer a
higher probability to earn a moderate amount of money over
a lower probability to earn a greater amount of money is more
pronounced in those subjects who need to get by with mod-
est scholarships that are also strictly dependent on the students’
performance. Concluding the experiment with a high chance
of gaining the moderate amount of approximately 50 € might
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represent an attractive prospect for these individuals, as this sum
may potentially amount to their weekly living costs. Losing this
amount due to the inclination to more risk-loving behavior might
be of less importance for subjects with more convenient modes of
ﬁnancing (family) or greater general income (employment). This
effect appears to be strictly dependent on the student’s ownpresent
personal situation. The parental income showed only a particu-
lar signiﬁcant difference in RRA between students with parents of
very low-income and the other students which appears to be coun-
terintuitive and difﬁcult to evaluate due to the small group size
(n = 10) and the high variance in the present sample. It is note-
worthy that this subgroup of subjects also showed signiﬁcantly
lower CFT performance (101.9 ± 17.4 vs. 115.5 ± 13.6; p = 0.002,
unpaired t-test) which might bias the results. For the wealth
factor, in fact, a more reasonable group difference could be
detected (low-income group: 0.25; other students: 0.73). Since the
low-income group also differs in several characteristics from the
remaining students (large portion of economics students [75%]
and signiﬁcantly lower intelligence [average IQ = 101]), it is
questionable whether the low parental income directly inﬂuenced
the RRA.
The small effect of the Big Five on risk aversion was somewhat
striking. We expected personality to substantially affect gain/risk
behavior. Nevertheless, there are only few reports of experiments
which correlate personality dimensions to (ﬁnancial) decision
making (Mueller et al., 2010; Wischniewski and Brune, 2012).
Some previous investigations have linked the dopamine system
– which is highly involved in the decision making process – to
personality dimensions. Very early in the history of positron emis-
sion tomography (PET) investigations, some associations between
the D2/3 receptor availability and personality traits (e.g., personal
detachment) were reported (Breier et al., 1998). A recent complex
double tracer study showed that a blunted dopamine response
under stress conditions was correlated with various subitems of
the “neuroticism” dimension. The dopamine driven reward sys-
tem is the major inﬂuence on the processing of gain predictions
(Yacubian et al., 2006; Hernandez et al., 2012) whereas loss pre-
dictions appear to be processed by different circuits. Nevertheless,
“neuroticism” had not the least effect on the RRA results in the
present investigation. Two possible reasons may account for this
ﬁnding. There is a broad spectrum of items that are subsumed
in this personality dimension. The items cover a widespread clus-
ter of behavioral traits including such items as depressiveness and
anxiety on the one hand and hostility and impulsiveness on the
other. We initially suggested that increased impulsiveness might
incline the subject toward higher risk seeking behavior; a rather
negativistic or anxious attitude, however, might promote choos-
ing safer stakes. Furthermore, the importance of impulsivitymight
be limited in the Holt and Laury paradigm since the subjects had
enough time to make their choice. The directions of the regression
analysis for “agreeableness” and “openness,” which unexpectedly
reached statistical signiﬁcance in the ANOVA, were counterintu-
itive at ﬁrst glance. However, some previous investigations, which
do not focus on ﬁnancial decision making, are congruent with the
present ﬁndings. In particular, Gullone and Moore (2000) showed
that the “openness” item negatively correlated with reckless risk
taking behavior in adolescence whereas “agreeableness” showed
positive correlations with thrill seeking behavior. Furthermore,
the effect was modest and comparable to the present results.
Another parallel observation was the lack of any association
between the “neuroticism” score and thrill seeking or reckless risk
taking behavior. We had expected the dimension “neuroticism”
to reﬂect behavioral traits that support anxiety-related as well as
impulsive reactions. Whereas there seems to be some association
between “neuroticism” and “impulsivity” (Rosler et al., 2004) or
compulsive buying behavior (Muller and de Zwaan, 2010) and
some studies suggest that anxiety-related traits promote a defen-
sive strategy. On the other hand, anxiety-related traits also seem
suited to promote a defensive strategy (Maner and Schmidt, 2006;
Giorgetta et al., 2012) Furthermore, a subsample of individuals
showing compulsive buying behavior exhibited greatly increased
“neuroticism” scores, a report comparing personality traits with
the Holt and Laury paradigm as well as with a gambling task men-
tioned that the respective associations were clearly not congruent;
the authors stated that “gambling attitudes do not impact behav-
ior in the Holt and Laury task” (Deck et al., 2008). In a study
conducted by Becker et al. (2012), of all personality dimensions
“agreeableness”and to a lesser extent“openness”showed moderate
correlations with measures of economic preferences. In summary
however, they found that the degree of association between per-
sonality factors and economic preference was rather low, and since
they found no strong linear relationship, they concluded that the
two concepts have to be considered as complimentary. They indi-
cate that although there are relationships between them, person-
ality dimensions and individual measures of economic decision
making cannot be substituted. So certainly, impulsiveness and eco-
nomic risk aversion cannot be expected to be found on the same
continuum.
Another recent study, again, found that the item“agreeableness”
was negatively associated with risk perception in transport behav-
ioral adaptations (Fyhri and Backer-Grondahl, 2012). It is there-
fore still conceivable that personality factors have amoderate effect
on risky ﬁnancial decision making; however, it is possible that
the characterization of personality traits by the NEO FFI is not
perfectly suited to describe the underlying mechanisms. It is pos-
sible that the use of more diversiﬁed inventories differentiating
other personality dimensions would have helped to enlighten this
relationship.
Another potentially relevant aspect in this discussion is an
MRI ﬁnding that Tobler et al. (2007) presented. Their data favor
the concept that the two basic economic decision parameters,
expected value and uncertainty of reward, are coded in distinct
key reward structures in the brain, thus conﬁrming that these
reward components are processed separately. This aspect has not
sufﬁciently been accounted for in the present study, which might
add to the explanation of the rather small association between
risk aversion and personality traits. Other studies (Christopou-
los et al., 2009; Rudorf et al., 2012) also postulate distinct neural
correlates for the different aspects of risky decision making, such
as value or magnitude, and expected value, risk and risk aver-
sion, although they also concede that the brain responses they
attribute to speciﬁc decision parameters are not exclusive, and
stress that complex cognitive processes such as decision making
involve a complex combination of signals from different brain
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regions. The key regions involved in risky decision making seem
to be the insula, frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate, and ventral
striatum.
A recent study investigating the individual determinants of
willingness to take risks Dohmen et al. (2011) found a signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence of age, gender, height, and parental background,
conﬁrming on the one hand our decision to control for age and
gender as inﬂuential factors in order to focus on environmen-
tal and personality factors, on the other hand supporting our
ﬁndings of the relevance of parental background. Interestingly,
in the latter study, the authors concluded from their data that
the determinants are robust across different contexts of risk tak-
ing. Another intention of the present investigation was to clarify
the question whether the original version of the Holt and Laury
paradigm could be too transparent for the individual’s risk assess-
ment. The sequential version was designed to reduce transparency
and provoke more emotional decisions in the subject. The only
observable effect in this regard, however, was the frequent occur-
rence of inconsistencies (switching back) which were explicitly
allowed. It was somewhat surprising that the switching points
in this approach (sequential version) were, nevertheless, highly
correlated with the switching points of the original matrix version
and did not provide any further evidence regarding the primary
hypotheses. Apparently, decisionmakingwithout awareness of the
whole decisionmatrix increases the number of inconsistencies, but
does not affect the individual’s fundamental risk evaluation.
This investigation is an experimental prospective study with
a sufﬁcient group size that treats the underlying mechanisms of
ﬁnancial decision making. We claim the sample size of 150 to
be sufﬁcient, as the design only included subjects that matched
the strictly deﬁned inclusion criteria and who thus represented
a relatively homogeneous group. This was done to control for
obviously inﬂuencing factors such as age, gender, mental illness,
and ﬁnancial difﬁculties. Taken together, the results strengthen
the importance of subject’s current ﬁnancial environment (secu-
rity/independence). In the present group, this factor appears
to be stronger than the effect of the subject’s (family) history
and, surprisingly, than personality factors. Personality to some
extent is linked to neurobiological mechanisms, which however,
were not subject of the present investigation. A more precise
evaluation of certain personality issues and their underlying neu-
robiology might have revealed stronger associations. As depicted
in Figure 5, environmental factors might generally modulate
the risk aversion/risk seeking behavior but may also act specif-
ically on ﬁnancial decisions via deﬁned ﬁnancial experiences.
This study, however, also reveals that economic preoccupations
FIGURE 5 | Model depicting possible influences on risk averse or
risk seeking behavior. Personality factors, as well as neurobiological
mechanisms, modulate general risk aversion. However, as enlightened
by this study, also environmental factors have a high impact on risk
aversion. This may be a direct association, but also mediated by
economic experiences. Furthermore, economic preoccupations as well as
cognitive performance can independently affect the ﬁnancial decision
making process. (Factors and causalities in gray color depict reasonable
associations which were, however, not subject to the present
investigation.)
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and the proximity to economic topics (ﬁeld of study) are able
to modulate the ﬁnancial RRA independently from the before-
mentioned factors. Since economic decisions usually demand
a basic understanding of risks, gains and uncertainties, the
level of cognitive function is also biasing the decision pro-
cess. Future investigations should try to simulate loss situations;
others might focus on the neurobiological bases of the rela-
tionships described above, e.g., the dopaminergic response and
neural correlates such as activated networks measured by the
MRI.
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